This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results characterize interim efficient allocations under uncertainty; that is, they provide conditions on the sets of posteriors, thus implicitly on the way how agents update the sets of priors, for non-existence of a trade which makes all agents better off at any realization of private information. For agents with the incomplete preferences, the condition is necessary and sufficient, but for agents with the maximin expected utility preferences, the condition is sufficient only. A couple of necessary conditions for the latter case are provided. JEL classification numbers: D81, D82, D84.
Introduction
This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. There are a finite number of states and in each state there is a single good. There are a finite number of agents and each agent has private information about the states. We model uncertainty by so called multiple priors; that is, for each agent, uncertainty is represented by sets of priors and sets of posteriors. The good is evaluated by concave utility index functions, from which agents derive either Bewley's [4] incomplete preferences (BI-preferences for short) or Gilboa-Schmeidler's [10] maximin expected utility preferences (MEU-preferences for short).
Prior sets induce preferences in the ex ante stage (before the receipt of private information) and posterior sets induce preferences in the interim stage (after the receipt of private information). An allocation is ex ante efficient if there is no feasible trade which makes all agents better off in the ex ante sage. Bewley [3] and Rigotti and Shannon [22] characterized ex ante efficient allocations by prior sets for agents with BI-preferences, and Billot et al. [2] characterized ex ante efficient allocations similarly for agents with MEU-preferences. 1 An allocation is interim efficient if there is no feasible trade which makes all agents better off in the interim sage for any realization of private information. No attempt has been made to obtain a counterpart for interim efficient allocations as far as we are aware of.
The purpose of this paper is to provide characterizations of interim efficient allocations by posterior sets for agents with BI-preferences and MEU-preferences. The key concept in our characterizations is the compatible prior set of an agent, which is defined as the collection of all the probability distributions such that, for each piece of private information of the agent, the conditional probability distributions are in the corresponding posterior set of the agent. The compatible prior set of an agent coincides with the convex hull of all posteriors of the agent. The main results show the following: for agents with BI-preferences, an allocation is interim efficient if and only if it is ex ante efficient for agents possessing their compatible prior sets as their own prior sets; and for agents with MEU-preferences, an allocation is interim efficient if the same condition holds, but not vice versa. Thus, ex ante efficiency with respect to the compatible prior sets is necessary and sufficient for interim efficiency for the former case, but it is sufficient only for the latter case. To obtain a sharper result tor the latter case, we restrict our attention to a limited class of allocations and provide a couple of necessary conditions for interim efficiency.
In the standard Bayesian models, Morris [19] and Feinberg [9] provided a characterization of interim efficient allocations, 2 which is closely related to the agreement theorem of Aumann [1] . The agreement theorem in this context asserts that if agents with linear utility index functions have a common prior, then an allocation is interim efficient. The result of Morris [19] and Feinberg [9] implies the converse: if an allocation is interim efficient for agents with linear utility index functions, then there is a prior which induces all the agents' posteriors; that is, it appears as if they share a fictitious common prior. Our results have the corresponding implication when utility index functions are linear; that is, for agents with BI-preferences, an allocation is interim efficient if and only if the compatible prior sets of all agents have a non-empty intersection, whose element is interpreted as a fictitious common prior.
Characterizations of interim efficient allocations are important in the context of the no trade theorem [18] : it asserts that any ex ante efficient allocation is interim efficient, as interpreted by Holmström and Myerson [15] , and thus purely speculative trade is impossible. A simple and intuitive explanation for the no trade theorem is that agents in the standard Bayesian models are dynamically consistent. By combining the characterization of ex ante efficient allocations and that of interim efficient allocations, we can obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for any ex ante allocation to be interim efficient for agents with BI-preferences. 3 Using this condition, we show that if agents with BI-preferences derive posterior sets from prior sets by prior-by-prior Bayesian updating, then the no trade theorem holds. We also argue that agents with BI-preferences are dynamically consistent indeed. On the other hand, for agents with MEU-preferences, the no trade theorem does not hold because agents are not dynamically consistent. Epstein and Schneider [7] and Wakai [25] identified a sufficient condition for agents to be dynamically consistent by introducing rectangular prior sets. The compatible prior sets in this paper turn out to be rectangular prior sets, which explains why ex ante efficiency with respect to the compatible prior sets is sufficient for interim efficiency.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 reports the characterization of interim efficient allocations for agents with BI-preferences, and Section 4 reports that for agents with MEU-preferences. Section 5 discusses issues of dynamic consistency, the agreement theorem, and conditional preferences in the multiple priors models.
Setup
In this section, we set up the model of an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. There is a finite set of sates Ω = {1, . . . , n}. 4 Let ∆(Ω) be the set of all probability distributions over Ω, and let P 2 ∆(Ω) be the collection of all non-empty, convex, and closed subsets of ∆(Ω). For p ∈ ∆(Ω) and z ∈ R Ω , let
be the expected value of a random variable z with respect to p. We write E P [z] = min p∈P E p [z] for P ∈ P, which is the minimum expected value of z where the minimum is taken over P . Note that the minimum exists because each P ∈ P is compact. For a function f : R → R and z ∈ R Ω , we write
for P ∈ P with some abuse of notation.
There is a finite set of agents I = {1, . . . , I}. Agent i ∈ I has an information partition Π i
2 Ω of Ω with a generic element π i ∈ Π i . We write π i (ω) ∈ Π i for the partition element containing ω ∈ Ω; agent i observes π i (ω) as private information when the true state is ω. Agent i has a set of priors P i ∈ P, which represents his prior beliefs, and a set of posteriors Φ i (π i ) ∈ P for each π i ∈ Π i , which represents his posterior beliefs after observing π i . We write Φ i = {Φ i (π i )} π i ∈Π i for the collection of all posteriors of agent i. For P i , we assume that max p∈P i p(π i ) > 0 for each π i ∈ Π i , and for Φ i , we assume that p(π i ) = 1 for each p ∈ Φ i (π i ) and π i ∈ Π i . 5 There is a single good in the economy, and agent i ∈ I has a concave, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable 6 utility index function u i : R + → R, which together with P i and Φ i induces Bewley's incomplete preferences [4] or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences [10] . Let x i , x i ∈ R Ω + be contingent consumption 4 We use a finite set of states to avoid topological and measure theoretic complications. 5 It might be natural to assume some relationship between Pi and Φi by some updating rule, but we assume nothing a priori. 6 A similar analysis can be done with continuity only; by concavity, ui has the right derivative everywhere, and replace u i with the right derivative.
bundles. Bewley's incomplete preferences (BI-preferences for short) are determined as follows: in the ex ante stage, agent i prefers 
where x i ∈ R Ω + is a contingent consumption bundle of agent i ∈ I. To avoid cumbersome boundary arguments, we restrict our attention to an interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ in the following analysis. We call t = (t 1 , . . . , t I ) ∈ R Ω×I a feasible trade at an allocation x if ∑ i∈I t i = 0 and x + t is also an allocation. We say that an allocation x is ex ante efficient if there is no feasible trade t at x such that, in the ex ante stage, agent i prefers x i + t i to x i for each i ∈ I. We say that an allocation x is interim efficient if there is no feasible trade t at x such that, in the interim stage, agent i with any private information π i ∈ Π i prefers x i + t i to x i for each i ∈ I. Note that these concept of efficiency are defined for both BI-preferences and MEU-preferences.
Efficiency with BI-preferences
In this section, we assume that all agents have BI-preferences. We first review the characterization of ex ante efficient allocations due to Bewley [3] and Rigotti and Shannon [22] .
For each i ∈ I, x i ∈ R Ω ++ , and P ∈ P, let
which is the set of marginal-utility weighted priors at the bundle
is constant, and thus Ξ i (P, x i ) = P . Bewley [3] and Rigotti and Shannon [22] have established the following result. 
To appreciate Proposition 1, recall that the fundamental theorems of welfare economics assert that efficiency is equivalent to the existence of a common supporting vector of agents' upper contour sets. It can be shown that Ξ i (P i , x i ) is the set of all normalized supporting vectors of the upper contour set {t i ∈ R Ω : (2) is equivalent to the existence of a common supporting vector. In this sense, Proposition 1 is essentially the fundamental theorems of welfare economics.
We use Proposition 1 to characterize interim efficient allocations. The key concept in our characterization is a special set of probability distributions over Ω derived from Φ i , which is defined as follows.
Let P * i be the collection of all Φ i -compatible priors, which is our key concept. We refers to P * i as the Φ i -compatible prior set.
Note that p ∈ P * i if and only if there exists q ∈ ∆(Ω) and r(·|π
Thus, we can write
where
by (3) and the following result in convex analysis. 7
Therefore, P * i is non-empty, convex, and closed, i.e., P * i ∈ P, since Φ i (π i ) is nonempty, convex, and closed for each π i ∈ Π i . The expression (4) results in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For any
is attained at an extreme point of co(
By Lemma 2, a characterization of interim efficient allocations can be reduced to that for ex ante efficient allocations with a set of priors P * i , which is "fictitious" in the sense that P * i may be different from the "true" set of priors P i . This leads us to the following main result of this paper.
Proposition 2 Assume that all agents have BI-preferences. An interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ is interim efficient if and only if
Proof. By Proposition 1, (5) holds if and only if there is no feasible trade t at x such that (5) holds if and only if x is interim efficient.
we see that this is true if and only if there is no feasible trade
For example, suppose that u i is linear for each i ∈ I. Then,
++ and i ∈ I, and thus the condition (5) is reduced to
with p(π i ) > 0 and i ∈ I. In this case, Proposition 2 says that the existence of a fictitious common prior is necessary and sufficient for interim efficiency, which is the result obtained by Morris [19] and Feinberg [9] .
We use Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 to study the possibility of purely speculative trade. Recall that interim efficiency of an allocation implies non-existence of a trade to which all agents agree in the interim stage under any realization of private information. Thus, if any ex ante efficient allocation is interim efficient, speculative trade is impossible. In the standard Bayesian models, any ex ante efficient allocation is automatically interim efficient as shown by Milgrom and Stokey [18] , which we refer to as the no trade theorem.
The following result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the no trade theorem to hold in our model. Since we do not assume any updating rule yet, the condition is stated in terms of the relationship between P 1 , . . . , P I and Φ 1 , . . . , Φ I . We omit a proof because it is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
Corollary 3 Assume that all agents have BI-preferences. The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) any ex ante efficient allocation
Since P * i is derived from Φ i , the condition (ii) above is a requirement for the relationship between P 1 , . . . , P I and Φ 1 , . . . , Φ I . Thus, it is interesting to ask if the condition (ii) is satisfied for a given updating rule of multiple priors, which induces Φ i from P i . Note that, in the standard Bayesian models, the condition (ii) is always true. We study this question for two popular updating rules of multiple priors in the remainder of this section. 8 One updating rule of multiple priors is the full Bayesian updating rule. We say that Φ i is the full Bayesian updating (FB-updating for short) of P i if
where cl P denotes the closure of P ⊆ ∆(Ω). The FB-updating is the collection of all conditional probability distributions of the priors in P i . It can be checked that Φ i (π i ) is a non-empty, 9 convex, and closed subset of ∆(Ω) and thus Φ i (π i ) ∈ P. Observe that Φ i is the FB-updating of the Φ i -compatible prior set P * i . Furthermore, P * i is maximal in the following sense.
Lemma 3 If Φ i is the FB-updating of
8 See Gilboa and Schmeidler [11] for the study of updating rules, for example. 9 Recall that, by the assumption on Pi, maxp∈P i p(πi) > 0 for each πi ∈ Πi.
Proof. Recall that P * i consists of all probability distributions over Ω of the form p = ∑
This implies that p ∈ P * i and thus P i ⊆ P * i .
Corollary 3 and Lemma 3 implies that any ex ante efficient allocation is interim efficient if all agents adopt the FB-updating.
Proposition 4 Assume that all agents have BI-preferences and that Φ i is the FBupdating of
Proof. By Lemma 3,
Therefore, by Corollary 3, any ex ante allocation is interim efficient.
Especially, suppose that u i is linear and that Φ i is the FB-updating of P i for each i ∈ I. If agents' prior sets are common, then any interior allocation is interim efficient by Proposition 1 and Proposition 4. The converse is not necessarily true. In the next example, though there is no prior set P such that Φ i is the FB-updating of P for each i ∈ I, any interior allocation is interim efficient. This is in a sharp contrast with the standard Bayesian models where Φ i (π i ) is a singleton for each π i and i, where ∩ i∈I P * i = ∅ implies the existence of p ∈ ∆(Ω) such that Φ i is the FB-updating of {p} for each i ∈ I.
Example 1
Let Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4} and I = {1, 2}. For agent 1, let Π 1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}},
On the other hand, by Proposition 1, no interior allocation is ex ante efficient because P 1 ∩ P 2 = ∅. Moreover, in this example, there is no common prior set P ∈ P such that Φ i is the FB-updating of P for each i. In fact, if Φ 1 is the FB-updating of P , then P cannot be a singleton, and if Φ 2 is the FB-updating of P , then P = Φ 2 (Ω), which is a singleton. Thus, P cannot be a common prior set which induces both Φ 1 and Φ 2 .
Another updating rule of multiple priors is the maximum likelihood updating rule. We say that Φ i is the maximum likelihood updating (ML-updating for short) of P i if
The ML-updating is the collection of all conditional probability distributions of the priors in P i that maximize the likelihood of the observed private information. As the next example of the ML-updating shows, an ex ante efficient allocation is not necessarily interim efficient even if agents have a common prior set, which is different from the result for the FB-updating.
Example 2
Let Ω, I, and Π i be those given in Example 1 for each i ∈ I.
, 3/4)}, and Φ 2 (Ω) = P 2 . It can be checked that Φ i is the MLupdating of P i for each i.
Let u i be linear for each i. By Proposition 1, any interior allocation is ex ante efficient since P 1 = P 2 , and by Proposition 2, no interior allocation is interim efficient since P * 1 ∩ P * 2 = ∅.
Efficiency with MEU-preferences
In this section, we assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. We first review and generalize the characterization of ex ante efficient allocations due to Billot et al. [2] . For a set of priors P i ∈ P and a contingent consumption bundle x i ∈ R Ω + of agent i ∈ I, we call p ∈ P i an active prior of agent i in
is linear in p ∈ P i and P i ∈ P is non-empty, convex, and closed, P i (x i ) is also non-empty, convex, and closed, i.e., P i (
is also constant over p ∈ ∆(Ω) and thus P i (x i ) = P i . The following proposition characterizes ex ante efficient allocations.
Proposition 5 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. An interior allocation x ∈ R

Ω×I ++ is ex ante efficient if and only if
As Proposition 1 is essentially the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, so is Proposition 5 where Ξ i (P i (x i ), x i ) is the set of all normalized supporting vectors of the upper contour set {t i ∈ R Ω :
showed a special case 10 of Proposition 5 in which an interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ has the full insurance property, i.e., x i (·) is constant for each i ∈ I. In this case, every prior is active, by which the condition (6) is reduced to
which is the condition Billot et al. [2] found. In the context of asset pricing models with a representative agent (with MEU preferences), it is well known that active priors determine the supporting vectors [6, 8] . Proposition 5 is a natural consequence of this, but, to the best of our knowledge, no work has explicitly stated it. So we give a formal proof based upon the fundamental theorems of welfare economics in the appendix.
Let
denote the sets of all active Φ i -compatible priors. By replacing P i (x i ) with P * i (x i ) in (6), we obtain the following characterization of interim efficient allocations.
Proposition 6 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. An interior allocation
If an interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ is interim efficient and the interim expected utility
Note that the condition (7) is sufficient but not necessary for interim efficiency. In fact, in some cases, an allocation is interim efficient even if (7) is not true, and in that case, a sharper characterization is possible. We say that an allocation x ∈ R Ω×I + has the full insurance property in the interim stage if, for each π i ∈ Π i and each i ∈ I, the restriction of x i (·) to π i is constant. Clearly, if x has the full insurance property, then it has it in the interim stage, but not vice versa. 
Proposition 7 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. Let an interior allocation
Note that, since P * i (x i ) P * i generically, (8) is strictly weaker than (7). This shows that the condition (7) is not necessary for interim efficiency.
We first prove Proposition 6 using the following lemma.
Lemma 4 For any
z, z ∈ R Ω , if E Φ i (π i ) [z] > E Φ i (π i ) [z ] for each π i ∈ Π i , then E P * i [z] > E P * i [z ]. Suppose that E Φ i (π i ) [z ] is constant over π i ∈ Π i . Then, E Φ i (π i ) [z] > E Φ i (π i ) [z ] for each π i ∈ Π i if and only if E P * i [z] > E P * i [z ].
Proof. By Lemma 2, E P
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that (7) holds. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that x is not interim efficient. Then, there exists a feasible trade t at x such that
for each π i ∈ Π i and i ∈ I. By Lemma 4, this implies that
On the other hand, Proposition 5 implies that if (7) is true, then there is no feasible trade t at x such that
for each i ∈ I, a contradiction. Thus, the first half of the proposition is established.
To establish the second half, assume that x is interim efficient and
It is enough to show that there is no feasible trade
for each i ∈ I because if this is true then (7) holds by Proposition 5. Seeking a contradiction, suppose otherwise and let t be a feasible trade at
for each π i ∈ Π i , which contradicts to the interim efficiency of x. Thus, the second half of the proposition is established.
In the proof of Proposition 7, the following lemma is essential. 
Lemma 5 Let
Proof of Proposition 7. Let an interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ have the full insurance property in the interim stage. By Lemma 5, for a feasible trade t at x,
and i ∈ I. This implies that x is interim efficient with MEU-preferences if and only if it is interim efficient with BI-preferences. Therefore, by Proposition 2, x is interim efficient with MEU-preferences if and only if (8) holds.
To understand the role of the assumptions on allocations in Proposition 6 and Proposition 7, consider the following example.
Example 3
Let Ω, I, and Π i be those given in Example 1 for each i ∈ I. Let P 1 and Φ 1 be those given in Example 1 and set P 2 = Φ 2 (Ω) = P 1 . Note that Φ i is the FB-updating of P i for each i ∈ I. Let u i (c) = c for each c ∈ R + and i ∈ I.
Suppose that x 1 = (1, 3, 1, 3) and x 2 = (3, 1, 3, 1).
x is ex ante efficient, and by Proposition 6, x is not interim efficient. Thus, the no trade theorem fails under the FB-updating.
Suppose that x 1 = (1, 1, 3, 3 ) and x 2 = (1, 1, 1, 1 ). Note that x has the full insurance property in the interim stage. We have P 1 (x 1 ) = {(1/6, 1/2, 1/6, 1/6)}, P 2 (x 2 ) = P 2 ,
= ∅, and P * 1 ∩ P * 2 = ∅. By Proposition 5, x is ex ante efficient, and by Proposition 7, x is interim efficient. So this is an instance where (8) is strictly weaker than (7).
We can use Proposition 6 and Proposition 7 to study the possibility of speculative trade for agents with MEU preferences. The following corollaries are the counter parts of Corollary 3 in the previous section. We omit proofs because they are direct consequences of Proposition 5, Proposition 6, and Proposition 7.
Corollary 8 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. Let an interior allocation x ∈ R
Ω×I ++ be such that the interim expected utility
The following two conditions are equivalent:
Corollary 9 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences. Let an interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ have the full insurance property in the interim stage. The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) if x is ex ante efficient, then it is interim efficient; (ii) if
By showing that the FB-updating satisfies the condition (ii) in Corollary 9, we obtain the following result. 
Proposition 10 Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences and that
Proof. Since
, which implies (ii) in Corollary 9.
Discussions
Dynamic consistency
Proposition 4 have established the no trade theorem in the multiple priors models with BI-preferences and FB-updating. As is well known, the no trade theorem in the standard Bayesian models is a consequence of dynamic consistency of agents' behavior. Thus, it is natural to ask whether Proposition 4 can be understood as a consequence of some kind of dynamic consistency. In this subsection, we provide an affirmative answer to this question. Let x i , x i ∈ R Ω + be contingent consumption bundles. We define dynamic consistency as follows. Agent i ∈ I is said to be dynamically consistent if agent i prefers x i to x i in the ex ante stage whenever agent i with every private information π i ∈ Π i prefers x i to x i in the interim stage. If every agent is dynamically consistent, then any ex ante efficient allocation is interim efficient. 11 The following lemma shows that agents with BI-preferences and FB-updating is dynamically consistent.
Lemma 6 Assume that agent i ∈ I has BI-preferences and that Φ i is the FB-updating of P i . Then, agent i is dynamically consistent.
Proof. Suppose that agent i with each π i ∈ Π i prefers x i to x i in the interim stage. Then,
This implies that
Therefore, agent i prefers x i to x i in the ex ante stage.
On the other hand, agents with MEU-preferences are not necessarily dynamically consistent. Epstein and Schneider [7] and Wakai [25] identified a class of priors and 11 If an allocation x is not interim efficient, there exists another allocation x such that every player with every private information prefers x i to xi in the interim stage. If agents are dynamically consistent, then every player prefers x i to xi in the ex ante stage, implying that x is not ex ante efficient.
posteriors with which agents are dynamically consistent. A set of priors P i ∈ P is said to be a Φ i -rectangular prior set 12 if
Note that if P i is a Φ i -rectangular prior set, then Φ i must be the FB-updating of P i , but not vice versa; that is, if Φ i is the FB-updating of P i then
holds where this set inclusion may be strict in general. As shown by Epstein and Schneider [7] and Wakai [25] , agents with MEU-preferences and rectangular prior sets are dynamically consistent. Based upon this, Wakai [25] showed the following result.
Proposition 11
Assume that all agents have MEU-preferences and that P i is a Φ irectangular prior set for each i ∈ I. Then, any ex ante efficient allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ is interim efficient.
Proposition 11 explains the first part of Proposition 6 because P * i is a Φ i -rectangular prior set. The following result is immediate from (3) and (9).
Lemma 7
The Φ i -compatible prior set P * i is the Φ i -rectangular set such that P i ⊆ P * i for any Φ i -rectangular prior set P i .
Suppose that P i = P * i for each i ∈ I. If an interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ satisfies (7), then x is ex ante efficient by Proposition 5. Thus, dynamic consistency implies that it is also interim efficient, which corresponds to the first part of Proposition 6.
Conditional preferences
Up to this point, it has been posterior beliefs that induce interim preferences. But there is a direct way to derive interim preferences from ex ante preferences without using posterior beliefs, which we refer to as conditional preferences. When general preferences are considered (that is, beliefs are not necessarily specified separately), conditional preferences are regarded as a natural candidate for interim preferences. In this subsection, we briefly discuss an implication of our results for the "conditional preferences" approach.
Let ex ante preferences of agent i ∈ I be given, which may be any preferences. For two contingent consumption bundles x i , x i ∈ R Ω + and an event E ∈ 2 Ω , let x iE x i ∈ R Ω + be the contingent consumption bundle defined by x iE x i (ω) = x i (ω) if ω ∈ E and x iE x i (ω) = x i (ω) otherwise. Note that agent i having x iE x i consumes x i on E and x i on Ω\E. We say that agent i conditionally prefers x i to x i on π i if agent i prefers x iπ i x i to x i in the ex ante stage. Define interim preferences by the following rule: in the interim stage, agent i with private information π i ∈ Π i prefers x i to x i if and only if agent i conditionally prefers x i to x i on π i . We call this type of induced interim preferences conditional preferences. We say that an allocation is conditionally efficient if it is interim efficient with the understanding that interim preferences of all agents are conditional preferences.
By construction, conditional preferences are uniquely determined from ex ante preferences. On the other hand, given a set of priors, there is a variety of ways of specifying a set of posteriors in our setup. Thus in general, interim preferences induced by posterior beliefs do not necessarily coincide with conditional preferences. But in some cases, they do. An important example is an agent with BI-preferences and the FB-updating. 
Lemma 8 Assume that agent i ∈ I has BI-preferences and that
Since Φ i is the FB-updating of P i , the above inequality implies
Using Lemma 8, we can translate our results for agents with BI-preferences and the FB-updating into those for agents with conditional BI-preferences. To see this, assume that all agents have BI-preferences and adopt the FB-updating. By Lemma 8, any interim efficient allocation is conditionally efficient. Thus, by Proposition 4, any ex ante efficient allocation is conditionally efficient.
Ma [17] and Halevy [13] considered general complete ex ante preferences and studied under what condition any ex ante efficient allocation is conditionally efficient. A sufficient condition given by Ma [17] and Halevy [13] is essentially the same as the weak decomposability axiom introduced by Grant et al. [12] . As shown by Grant et al. [12] , weakly decomposablity is equivalent to dynamic consistency in the sense defined in the previous subsection with the understanding that interim preferences are replaced with conditional preferences. This implies that, if all agents have weakly decomposable ex ante preferences, then any ex ante efficient allocation is conditionally efficient, which is essentially the "no trade theorem" of Ma [17] and Halevy [13] . Although these works assume complete preferences, careful reading reveals that the completeness assumption is not essential in their arguments. In fact, one can show that ex ante BI-preferences are weakly decomposable, which is consistent with the above discussion on conditional efficiency with ex ante BI-preferences.
The agreement theorem
Proposition 2 is related to the agreement theorem of Aumann [1] because the agreement theorem suggests that the existence of a common prior is sufficient for interim efficiency in the standard Bayesian models. In fact, as a corollary of Proposition 2, we can obtain a multiple priors version of the agreement theorem. Proof. Suppose on the contrary that p j < p i for some i, j ∈ I with i = j. We can choose c i , c j ∈ R ++ such that p j < c j < c i < p i . Let δ E ∈ R Ω be the indicator function of E ∈ 2 Ω , i.e., δ E (ω) = 1 if ω ∈ E and δ E (ω) = 0 otherwise. Note that p i = E Φ i (π i ) [δ E ] and p j = −E Φ j (π j ) [−δ E ] for each π i ∈ Π i and π j ∈ Π j . Let a trade t = (t 1 , . . . , t I ) ∈ R Ω×I be such that t i = δ E − c i + (c i − c j )/I, t j = c j − δ E + (c i − c j )/I, and t k = (c i − c j )/I for k = i, j. Note that ∑ k∈I t k = 0 and E Φ k (π k ) [t k ] > 0 for each π k ∈ Π k and k ∈ I. Now consider agents with linear utility index functions u k (c) = c for each c ∈ R + and k ∈ I. Then, for any interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ at which t is a feasible trade,
Corollary 12
for each π k ∈ Π k and k ∈ I, which implies that x is not interim efficient. This contradicts to ∩ k∈I P * k = ∅ by Proposition 2.
Note that if Φ i (π i ) is a singleton for each π i ∈ Π i and i ∈ I, then p i = p i . In this case, Corollary 12 says that if ∩ i∈I P * i = ∅ and all agents' posterior probabilities of E ∈ 2 Ω are constant over all ω ∈ Ω, then they must coincide, which is the agreement theorem of Aumann [1] . 13 Lemma B Let f : R n → R be a concave function and suppose 0 ∈ ∂f (x). Then, q · (y − x) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R n with f (y) ≥ f (x) if and only if q = λs for some λ ≥ 0 and s ∈ ∂f (x).
Let U i : R Ω + → R be such that U i (x i ) = E P i (u i (x i )) for each x i ∈ R Ω + and i ∈ I. It is straightforward to check that U i is continuous, strictly increasing, and concave. Thus, by Lemma A and Lemma B, an interior allocation x ∈ R The above turns out to be equivalent to (6) . To see this, we evaluate ∂U i (x i ) using the following lemma (see Theorem 4.4.2 of Lesson D in Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal [14] ). ) .
Lemma C Let
By Lemma C,
where the last equality holds since P i (x i ) is convex. Therefore, an interior allocation x ∈ R Ω×I ++ is ex ante efficient if and only if ∩ i∈I {q ∈ R Ω : q = λs for s ∈ ∂U i (x i ), λ ≥ 0} = ∩ i∈I {λ(p(ω)u i (x i (ω))) ω∈Ω ∈ R Ω : p ∈ P i (x i ), λ ≥ 0} = {0}.
This is true if and only if
which is (6).
